Antrittsvorlesungen
Wissenschaftliche Exzellenz, Leidenschaft und Innovationskraft leiten die Mitarbeiter*innen an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft seit ihrer Gründung in den Bereichen Forschung, Lehre und wissenschaftlicher Expertise. Die von unseren Forscher*innen geschaffenen Innovationen und Erkenntnisse bilden die Basis, mit der wir aktiv die Zukunft der Wirtschaftswissenschaften gestalten und unsere gesellschaftliche Verantwortung als Wissenschafts- und Bildungseinrichtung wahrnehmen. Mit den neuen Wissenschaftler*innen werden zudem neue Gebiete in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften erschlossen, was unser Verständnis erweitert und neue Erkenntnisse ermöglicht.
FADINGER, Harald - Universitätsprofessor
Designing Effective Carbon Border Adjustment with Minimal Information Requirements
1:15 - 2:00 PM Lecture Hall 14
Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics
Carbon leakage undermines the effectiveness of unilateral carbon pricing. Taxes on import-embedded emissions, like the EU’s CBAM, prevent leakage but their product coverage is limited due to strong information asymmetries. We propose an alternative policy (LBAM) that sterilizes carbon leakage without requiring information on foreign carbon intensities. In a quantitative trade model, LBAM tariffs significantly improve over the EU’s CBAM in terms of global emissions and EU welfare. Importantly, LBAM avoids large welfare losses among EU trading partners that would result if CBAM were extended to all sectors. Combining LBAM tariffs with equivalent export subsidies reinforces these advantages.
MITKOV, Yuliyan - Ass.-Prof.
Optimal Financial Intermediation
2:00 - 2:45 PM Lecture Hall 14
Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics
Banks are intermediaries that issue deposits to finance loans, which exposes them to runs. Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) argue that this financial fragility is precisely why banks emerge as a solution to the hold-up problem identified by Hart and Moore (1994). We revisit this framework and characterize the optimal financial intermediation arrangement, which maintains the desirable properties of deposits while avoiding runs. Thus, in contrast to Diamond and Rajan, we find that fragility is not essential for but rather detrimental to the efficient flow of credit in the economy. Our arrangement accommodates asset risk while remaining safer than deposits and consistent with creditor monitoring incentives. It also has a natural implementation as an open-end fund and is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, we identify government guarantees as a rationale for deposit financing.
